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Abstract 
Effective safety barrier management is a fundamental principle for prevention and 
mitigation of major accidents in offshore drilling and production operations.  Barrier 
management methods such as bow tie diagrams are commonly used for identifying safety 
barriers in the development of safety case documentation and the performance of major accident 
risk assessments.  In addition to such applications for establishing design baselines for offshore 
installations, some organizations are taking safety barrier management into the operational 
regime by establishing measures for assessing barrier health and assigning barrier owners to 
ensure that barriers are continuously maintained.  The next step in effective safety barrier 
management is to develop and implement methods to continuously monitor barriers in real time 
and provide decision guidance for operations, maintenance, and management personnel 
regarding actions to be taken when barriers are degraded or failed.  A systematic approach has 
been developed by DNV GL for identifying information requirements for dynamic barrier 
management, instrumentation or other sources of data for providing that information, decision 
criteria for determining when barriers are degraded or failed, and guidance for actions to be taken 
to restore degraded barriers and to prevent major accidents and mitigate their consequences.  The 
resulting information framework can be used to support communication, consensus, decision 
making and action across technical disciplines and organizational boundaries.  This paper 
summarizes the approach for the development of decision support tools for dynamic barrier 
management, and insights gained from application of the approach to offshore production and 
drilling operations with multiple industry partners.  In addition, the paper summarizes industry 
research and development activities that are needed for effective implementation of dynamic 
barrier management in the offshore oil and gas industry. 
 
Background and Need 
Assessment of the occurrence and recurrence of catastrophic accidents such as Three 
Mile Island, Columbia, Macondo, Fukushima, and major pipeline leak accidents has indicated a 
number of shortcomings of current risk management approaches.  First, in all these cases 
important safety barriers were missing, degraded, or failed, allowing the initiating event to 
progress to a major accident with catastrophic consequences.  In all these industries the need to 
establish and maintain effective barriers is well recognized, but in each case the critical barriers 
failed in some way.   
The second common element is that human decision making was not adequate to recognize 
the inadequacy of the critical barriers and to formulate effective corrective actions in time to 
prevent the accident or mitigate its consequences.  In some cases the most obvious decision 
making errors occurred during the event itself: 
• The Three Miles Island operators did not recognize that the primary coolant boundary 
had been breached and turned off the critical Emergency Core Cooling System. 
• The Columbia mission managers did not recognize that the wing leading edge had been 
breached by the foam impact, even though NASA engineers deep within the organization 
were analyzing that very scenario. 
• The personnel aboard the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig did not recognize the symptoms 
of a flowing well and take action in time to activate the blowout preventer (BOP) to 
prevent the blowout, fire, loss of the rig, 11 fatalities, and a major oil spill. 
• Numerous major pipeline leak accidents have occurred because control center operators 
did not recognize the symptoms of a leak, delaying the response to isolate the leak and 
resulting in major spills and environmental damages. 
An interesting variation of barrier management decision making during the course of a major 
accident is the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, where once the critical emergency 
electrical power supplies were engulfed by the tsunami, plant operators worked heroically in an 
effort restore and maintain the critical barriers for preventing the release of radioactive materials 
into the sea and the atmosphere.   
As tempting as it is, each of these types of “industry defining” catastrophic events cannot be 
completely described by focusing on decision making failures of the operating personnel during 
the “heat of the moment.”  In all cases, there were major shortcomings that occurred earlier in 
the project lifetime that “set the stage” for the barrier failures and decision making errors that 
occurred during the events.  
• The designers of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant did not provide instrumentation to 
conclusively indicate the position of the pilot operated relief valve or the level of liquid 
water in the pressurizer.  In addition, they did not provide adequate training and analysis 
tools to ensure that control room operators could clearly differentiate between liquid 
water and steam in the pressurizer. 
• Designers and mission management for the Columbia space shuttle did not provide 
adequate imaging systems and analysis tools to conclusively determine whether the 
Thermal Protection System of the wing’s leading edge had been breached. 
• The Deepwater Horizon blowout preventer was not designed to shear drill pipe that 
moved to an off-center position in the ram cavity. 
• Designers of the Fukushima nuclear plant did not design the location and protection of 
the emergency electrical power supplies to account for the effects of historically recorded 
tsunami events. 
• Pipeline operating companies did not provide procedures with clear guidance and 
decision criteria for recognizing symptoms of a leak and taking prompt action to isolate 
the leak before the occurrence of a major spill. 
Regardless of whether the critical decision making errors occur before or during the event 
that leads to a major accident, the common thread of all these events is that management 
personnel, engineers, and/or operators made incorrect or inadequate decisions regarding the 
design, maintenance, activation, or operation of critical safety barriers.  One possible 
contributing factor is that operations personnel and management may have a false sense of 
security and reduced vigilance because of their belief that robust barriers have been established, 
when in reality missing or degraded barriers could fail to prevent the progression of an accident 
when required.  This observation leads to the conclusion that it is not only essential to design 
effective barriers, but effective decision support must be provided to ensure that barriers are 
continuously monitored, accurate decision criteria are establish to identify when a barrier is 
degraded, and prompt and effective corrective action can be taken when required to prevent or 
mitigate the occurrence of a major accident. 
As can be seen from the conclusions reached in multiple incident reports for major accidents, 
it is also tempting to place the primary blame for catastrophic accidents on a poor safety culture.  
Major efforts and resources have been devoted to measure and improve safety culture; yet major 
accidents continue to happen within the same organization, as evidenced by the occurrence of the 
Challenger and Columbia space shuttle accidents only 17 years apart. 
The authors believe that the critical element that is missing to effectively manage offshore 
risks is to provide effective decision support for dynamic barrier management, so that all 
personnel have the information and tools they need to make effective risk informed decisions.   
 
Dynamic Barrier Management Concept 
Figure 1 shows the basic concepts for dynamic barrier management.  During the design 
of an offshore process or installation, barriers are established to prevent the occurrence of threats 
from leading to a major accident.  These barriers are included in the design baseline for 
regulatory approval and operation of the installation, and establish the baseline level of risk.  
However, if barriers are not continuously monitored and maintained over time, the barriers can 
degrade or fail, leading to an increased level of risk.  This can be very dangerous and lead to 
major accidents if the degradation or failure of the barrier is not detected. 
Dynamic barrier management establishes the information structure and processes for 
continuously monitoring the status of the barriers, detecting when barriers are degraded or failed, 
and determining what actions should be taken to restore the degraded barriers or add additional 
barriers if needed.  This allows the risk to be reduced back to the baseline level or lower. 
Dynamic barrier management can be applied in different ways depending on the 
timescales over which barriers can degrade, and the type of monitoring or instrumentation that is 
used to track the barrier status over time.  The examples of dynamic barrier management that are 
described in this paper focus on real-time decision support for components, systems, and barriers 
that are monitored using active sensors.  However, the concepts are equally applicable for other 
types of barriers that are continuously monitored over time using other methods such as periodic 
samples or auditing procedures.  The systematic information requirements analysis can be used 
to identify the requirements for barrier monitoring that are needed to support the decisions made 
by the relevant users.   
 
Figure 1. Dynamic barrier management 
 
Decision Support for Dynamic Barrier Management 
The DNV GL approach for decision support for dynamic barrier management combines 
bow tie diagrams from the offshore industry with the success path concept from the nuclear 
power industry.  By combining bow tie diagrams - which provide information about the barriers 
that can intervene in the progression of an accident, with response trees - which provide 
information on actions needed to maintain or restore the barriers, a comprehensive, robust 




Bow tie diagrams for barrier management 
A bow tie diagram shows the barriers that can be used to prevent a major accident or to 
mitigate its consequences.  Figure 2 shows an example bow tie diagram for deepwater drilling.  
The orange circle at the center of the diagram is the major accident or “Top Event” that is the 
focus of the assessment - in this case Loss of Containment for the drilling operation.  The blue 
rectangle on the left is the Threat - i.e. Pressurized Hydrocarbons - that can lead to Loss of 
Containment.  The rectangles between the Threat and the Top event are the barriers that can be 
used to prevent the Threat from leading to the Top Event - i.e. the Fluid Column, Blowout 
Preventer (BOP), and the Drilling Riser.  Barriers on the left side of the bow tie diagram are 
referred to as prevention barriers. 
Similarly, the red rectangles on the right hand side of the bow tie diagram are Potential 
Consequences that can result if Loss of Containment occurs.  Barriers are shown that can prevent 
or reduce the magnitude of the consequences.  Barriers on the right hand side of the bow tie 
diagram are called mitigation barriers. 
 
Figure 2. Bow tie diagram for deepwater drilling 
 
Success paths and response trees  
A success path is a combination of equipment and processes (e.g. hardware, software, 
and human actions) that are necessary for a barrier to perform its intended function.  The success 
path and critical safety function concepts were developed in the nuclear power industry 
following the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979 [1].  A response tree is a graphical 
representation of the alternative success paths that can be used to maintain or restore a barrier, 
and provides guidance for selecting the best success path to use when equipment failures degrade 
the barrier.  Response trees were developed at the Department of Energy’s Idaho National 
Engineering Laboratory (INEL) in 1978 for use in the severe accident procedures for a nuclear 
test reactor [2].   
Figure 3 shows a simplified response tree for the BOP barrier for deepwater drilling.  
Each pathway from the bottom of the tree to the top is a success path for implementing the BOP 
barrier.  In this case, a success path represents a pathway for hydraulic fluid from the source (e.g. 
surface or subsea accumulators) to flow to the port of a BOP ram in order to close it to maintain 
well integrity when required by a well kick or other conditions indicating potential well flow. 
The response tree is evaluated for failure of the yellow pod and the crossover line 
between the pods, as indicated by the boxes with the orange color.  Because of these failures, the 
success paths coded with the red color are no longer available for implementing the BOP barrier, 
while success paths colored green are available.  Decision criteria have been established to select 
the recommended success path that is preferred for this failure scenario, as shown by the boxes 
colored light blue. This preferred path can be implemented either by manual action or by 
automated reconfiguration of the BOP control system.  
 
 
Figure 3. Response tree for the blowout preventer barrier for well integrity 
The response tree shown represents a simplified picture of the multiple success paths 
available for a current two-pod blowout preventer with a crossover pathway.  The response tree 
approach can also be used to explore the potential benefits of alternative designs for BOP control 
systems, for example by providing additional redundancy or options for reconfiguration. 
Figure 4 shows how the response trees and bow tie diagrams are combined to form the 
framework for decision support for dynamic barrier management.  The BOP response tree is 
continuously monitored to determine the health of the BOP barrier for the Loss of Containment 
bow tie diagram.  If a failure or degraded condition is detected in one of the elements of the BOP 
response tree, the tree is evaluated to determine which success paths are disabled due to the 
failure, which paths remain available, and based on the pre-established decision criteria, which 
success path should be used to reconfigure the BOP control system to restore the BOP barrier.  
Then the BOP control system is reconfigured to implement this success path, either through 
manual operator action or automatically using the automated functions of the BOP control 
system. 
 
Figure 4. Combining bow tie diagrams and response trees for decision support for dynamic 
barrier management 
 
Information requirements analysis 
Table 1 shows how the information requirements, instrumentation requirements, and decision 
criteria are established for dynamic barrier management.  The first column of the table shows the 
elements of the bow tie diagram, with the left to right flow of the bow tie diagram represented 
from the rows moving from the bottom to the top of the table: 
• Threat 
• Prevention barrier 
• Prevention barrier success path 
• Top event 
• Mitigation barrier 
• Mitigation barrier success path 
• Consequence 
The columns are then systematically filled out in a workshop setting as follows: 
• Information requirement - The information that is needed to determine the current 
condition of the Threat, Prevention Barrier, Prevention Barrier Success Path, Top Event, 
Mitigation Barrier, Mitigation Barrier Success Path, and Consequence. 
• Source of information - Potential sources of the required information.  These sources of 
information can either be direct information sources (e.g. sensors that directly monitor the 
parameter) or indirect information sources (e.g. measurements that can be calculated or 
otherwise inferred from directly monitored parameters). 
• Decision criteria (IF) - Specific combinations of the parameters that indicate: 
- Occurrence or potential future occurrence of the threat 
- Degradation or failure of a prevention barrier 
- Occurrence or potential future occurrence of the Top Event 
- Degradation or failure of a mitigation barrier 
- Occurrence or potential future occurrence of the consequence 
• Response guidance (THEN) - Actions to be taken when the decision criteria are 
satisfied. 
The development of the information in this table forms the foundation for the decision support 
tool for dynamic barrier management.   
Table 1. Framework for Defining Information Needs and Decision Guidance for Dynamic 
Barrier Management 
 
Visualization and communication of information for dynamic barrier management 
The next step is to develop the displays for the Human Machine Interface (HMI) that will 
be used to present the information to operators, maintenance personnel, management, and 
(potentially) regulatory personnel.  Figure 5 shows one concept for displaying the information 
for the loss of containment bow tie diagram.  A dynamic well barrier schematic is used to show 
the current condition of the well control barriers including the BOP and the fluid column.  The 
Compliance Level display shows the current level of compliance with company (e.g. the well 
control manual) or regulatory requirements, for example the requirement to maintain two barriers 
at all times during drilling, completion, production, and abandonment operations. The Barrier 
Status display shows the overall assessment of the current condition of a specific barrier such as 
the fluid column or the BOP.  Finally, the success path status shows the current condition of the 
success paths for a particular barrier, in this case the fluid column barrier. 
 
Figure 5. Concept for application of dynamic barrier management to well integrity 
Figure 6 shows the overall strategy for dynamic barrier management for a specific process 
such as well integrity or for an entire installation.  Once again, the rows of the table show the 
elements of the bow tie diagram.  The columns of the diagram show the progression of the 
incident as and the actions to be taken follows: 
• Continuously monitor during standby conditions - The parameters that should be 
monitored during normal operating conditions. 
• IF: Degraded barrier conditions are present - Actions that should be taken if 
conditions of barrier degradation or failure are detected.  If a prevention barrier is 
degraded or failed a success path should be implemented to restore the prevention barrier.  
Similarly, if a mitigation barrier is degraded or failed a success path should be 
implemented to restore the mitigation barrier. 
• IF: Threat conditions are present - Actions that should be taken if one of the threats is 
detected or trends indicate that the threat might occur in the future. 
• IF: Top Event conditions are present - Actions that should be taken if the Top Event is 
detected or trends indicate that it may occur in the future 
• If Consequence conditions are present - Actions that should be taken if one of the 
Consequences is detected or trends indicate that it might occur in the future. 
 
Figure 6. Overall strategy for dynamic barrier management 
Figure 7 shows the overall long-term vision for dynamic barrier management.  We 
believe that the approach combining bow tie diagrams (representing barriers to intervene in the 
progression of an event), response trees (to assess the current condition of the barriers), and 
information requirements analysis (to define the decision criteria and actions to be taken when 
barriers are degraded or fail), can be applied at all levels within an organization and even across 
the industry.   
 
Figure 7. Vision for decision support for dynamic barrier management 
The left side of the diagram shows the flow of information that is used in dynamic barrier 
management: 
• Sensors - The instruments and other sources of information used to monitor barrier status. 
• Data - The information that is collected from the instruments. 
• Visualization - An intuitive representation is used to organize the data and present it to 
support human decision making. 
• Interpretation - The process that individual operators or the team use to attach meaning 
to the information presented on the visualization displays. 
• Insight - The process to understand how future conditions will be affected if current 
trends continue or alternative courses of action are taken. 
• Communication - Sharing of understanding among the members of the team and other 
stakeholders across disciplines or organizations. 
• Consensus - Reaching agreement on the assessment of the situation and selection of the 
best course of action to implement. 
• Decision - The formal conclusion is formalized and instructions are given for carrying 
out the prescribed actions and monitoring the outcomes. 
As shown in the columns across the diagram, a consistent approach can be applied to support 
decisions at each level of abstraction: 
• Component - Enhanced instrumentation and condition based monitoring can be used to 
monitor the status and health of the critical components that are needed to maintain the 
barriers.  Design personnel are the typical originators and users of information at this 
level. 
• Process/system - This level monitors the overall status and health of processes and 
systems used to maintain or restore barriers.  Engineering organizations are the typical 
users of this information. 
• Barrier health - This level monitors the current condition of the barriers, determines 
whether actions are required to maintain or restore the barrier, and selects and 
implements the selected success path.  Operations personnel and health, safety, and 
environment (HSE) personnel are typical users of the information at this level. 
• Installation - This level monitors the overall status and health of all the barriers 
affecting the entire installation and the conduct of the overall mission of the installation, 
e.g. drilling or production operations.  The information generated and applied at this 
level is similar to major accident risk assessments and safety case information.  However, 
dynamic barrier management makes it possible to continuously monitor barrier 
conditions at this level rather than limiting barrier management to a static assessment at 
the design stage with periodic updates during facility life.  Management personnel are 
the typical users of information at this level, and oversee the overall dynamic barrier 
management process for the installation.  
• Industry - One of the most promising applications of decision support for dynamic 
barrier management is for communication across stakeholder groups including industry 
groups such as the American Petroleum Institute (API) and Ocean Energy Safety 
Institute (OESI) and regulatory bodies such as the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement (BSEE).  The framework for organizing and visualizing information for 
dynamic barrier management and the process for making decisions can form a “common 
language” for communicating information and reaching consensus about required 
actions.  For example, the new well control rule proposed by BSEE will require real time 
monitoring of offshore parameters, transmission of the data to an onshore monitoring 
facility, and sharing the data with BSEE at their request.  A common structure or 
language will be needed to organize this information for sharing in a way that will allow 
meaningful discussion and common understanding among the stakeholders.  We believe 
that the framework for decision support for dynamic barrier management could be used 
to form the foundation for such a common language for discussion among industry 
stakeholders in the application of regulatory process and development of risk-informed 
industry standards. 
 
Applications of decision support for dynamic barrier management 
The DNV GL approach for decision support for dynamic barrier management has been 
under development for four years in projects assessing safety culture for a nuclear power plant 
and control room management for two different pipeline companies.  In the nuclear power 
studies the approach was applied to multiple past incidents to determine which barriers had failed 
and where corrective actions were needed to strengthen existing barriers or add new barriers to 
prevent the occurrences of similar incidents in the future. 
The studies of pipeline control room management were required by regulatory bodies as 
part of the process for approval for continued operation following the occurrence of major 
pipeline leak accidents.  In both accidents pipeline operators had failed to diagnose the 
occurrence of the pipeline leaks, and major oil spills occurred before the failed pipeline segments 
were isolated.  The dynamic barrier management approach was used to evaluate the team 
decision making processes that had led to the failure to diagnose the failure of the pipeline 
integrity barrier, and the actions that had been taken since the accident to strengthen the existing 
barriers or add additional barriers.  The application of the dynamic barrier management approach 
in a workshop setting helped the control room management personnel understand how 
inadequate decision processes led to the failure to diagnose and correct the leaks.  In addition, the 
bow tie diagrams that were annotated to highlight the improvements that had been made since 
the accident proved to be excellent communication tools to convey the assessment results to the 
regulatory authorities. 
Since these early applications of the dynamic barrier management approach for the 
assessment of past incidents and accidents, we have extended the focus to the development of 
real-time decision support tools.  The first application was for erosion integrity management for 
an offshore production facility.  We are currently supporting the development of a real-time 
decision support tool for well integrity barrier management in partnership with a drilling 
company and an offshore operator.  In addition to supporting real time operation, the dynamic 
barrier management framework for this application will also be used to communicate with 
regulators for initial approval of the new technology and assessment of operational decisions 





Based on the encouraging results that have been experienced in the projects described 
above, we are currently organizing a Joint Industry Project (JIP) to further develop concepts of 
decision support for dynamic barrier management.  We anticipate that the JIP participants will 
work together to develop methods, best practices, data sources and pilot-scale decision support 
systems that can then be adapted for targeted application within their home organizations.  This 
will help the industry move toward the long range vision to apply dynamic barrier management 
to reduce operational costs, decrease downtime, and increase safety for offshore operations.  
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
An approach for decision support for dynamic barrier management has been developed 
that combines proven methods for operational risk management from the offshore industry and 
nuclear power industry.  The combination of bow tie diagrams for barrier management and 
response trees for selecting success paths to restore degraded barriers provides an effective 
framework to organize information for managing risks of offshore operations.  The systematic 
approach for information requirements analysis is then applied to identify information needs and 
develop decision criteria for managing safety barriers throughout the operational life of an 
offshore process or installation.  In the future, the information framework for dynamic barrier 
management could support the development of a common risk-informed language for 
communication, consensus, and action among operators, suppliers, industry groups, regulatory 
bodies, and external stakeholders, allowing them to work together towards the common goal of 
improved offshore safety. 
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